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While some earthquakes pass almost unnoticed, others become dramatic 
markers of history and time, signalling the rise or fall of civilizations. Part 
of this power lies in the violent ability of earthquakes to shake individual 
and collective certainties – and for someone or something to capitalize 
or prosper on that uncertainty. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 caused 
Voltaire, Rousseau and others to herald the death of God (Voltaire 1988, 
2005; Kendrick 1956). The same events directed Kant’s (1764) then revo-
lutionary thought on the nature of rationality and the sublime. Mill (1848) 
provocatively saw earthquakes as periods of ‘accelerated consumption’, a 
form of ‘quantitative easing’ – to use a contemporary term – given by nine-
teenth-century nature. Lenin (1970) saw parallels between the political 
potential of disaster and revolutionary crisis.
Recent literature turns back to the eventful nature of earthquakes 
(and disasters more generally). Naomi Klein (2007), for example, 
describes ‘the shock doctrine’ of opportunistic capital at work; Solnit 
(2010) sees the positive revolutionary potential of disasters as people are 
brought together in common humanity. In these formulations, the earth-
quake is always a moment of total rupture into which history and politics 
collapse as something new – good or bad – is produced in the aftermath.
In this chapter, we use contemporary earthquake ethnography and 
accounts of other disasters from the secondary literature to look at the 
kinds of actions that accompany earthquakes. In particular, we look at 
the changing relations between citizens and their states in the wake of 
tectonic shifts. One of these earthquakes took place in Gujarat, west-
ern India, in 2001; the other in Nepal in 2015. We look for patterns in 
action and commonality at macro-, intermediate and individual levels. 
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The material presented is based on ethnographic research conducted 
over a decade in Gujarat by Simpson and between 2015 and 2017 in 
Nepal by Serafini. We write in the first person when referring to research 
undertaken on specific earthquakes and together in the rest of the chap-
ter. Along the way, we pause to examine the rupturing of other cata-
strophic events such as the philosophical aftermath of the earthquake in 
Lisbon and falling bombs and rocks. In all cases, we describe how initial 
moments of cooperation gave way, in the longer term, to conflict, con-
tested identity politics and radical conservatism, and to a general sea 
change in the big politics of our regions. We do this with the aim of trac-
ing some of the mechanics of rupture in the wake of an earthquake to 
observe the intimate as well as the political bearings of the philosophers’ 
moral disquisitions. Rupture is here taken as a sudden and widespread 
crisis of judgement (Roitman 2013). Akin to the situation described by 
Greenhouse (this volume), we see how different scales of doubt and rel-
ativity are brought together in friction by the little events that permeate 
the lives of those who survive. If an earthquake becomes a moment of 
total change, that happens because the same words, funds and policies 
are given to the puzzled eyes of those who have just endured loss and 
suffering.
There is a large literature on disasters and survival that we will 
not pretend to review here.1 Two studies stand out to us from the rest as 
seminal and eloquent: Robert Jay Lifton’s (1967) account of surviving 
the Hiroshima bomb and Barbara Bode’s (1989) descriptions of living 
through an earthquake in Highland Peru in 1970. Both writers (psycholo-
gist and anthropologist respectively) attempted to place the intimate and 
personal aspects of survival within a broad landscape of policy and social 
change. They had a deep understanding of the worlds they were writ-
ing about and could consequently see the multiple connections between 
things and meaning that were confused by disaster. They describe situa-
tions where categories and boundaries are blurred, where rival ideas and 
persons interact and produce unintended outcomes. Themes common 
to survivor literature such as anger, rehabilitation policy, budgets and 
shame all live together, sometimes in the same breath.
Bode recounts changes in individual mentality and structure. 
The disaster occurred two years after a coup in which General Velasco 
Alvarado took over the revolutionary leadership of the country. His ‘Inca 
socialism’ or ‘Peruanismo’ strove for freedom from the shackles of America 
and the doctrines of socialism and capitalism. Alvarado saw it possible to 
make a new human morality, resurrecting the Indian past and elevating 
suitable national heroes. Part of his vision was to integrate the  marginal 
 EARTHqUAKE C IT IZENS:  dISASTER ANd AFTERMATH POLIT ICS IN INdIA ANd NEPAL 195
sierra culture of Indian peasants (of which the earthquake- affected 
region was part) into the coast-dominated national sphere. Bode sug-
gests the General seized upon the disaster as a springboard to implement 
his imagined future. The Catholic Church too had expanded its presence 
in the valley in the years before the earthquake. Marxist inspired, the 
political hermeneutics of the gospel also came down squarely on improv-
ing the lot of the oppressed. Revolutionary and religious forces interpen-
etrated and stood united in an attempt to overturn the old hierarchical 
structures and to build a new egalitarian state.
Bode sees deliberate political will and the spread of neoliberal 
bureaucracy as keys to the transformation of the valley. The disaster 
became a providential mandate for redesigning all that had been. The 
state formed new branches to oversee reconstruction and the formation 
of a new social order. At the same time, changes were afoot at a more 
intimate level. The Catholic Church took ‘progress’ to mean that false and 
sinful religious practices, such as the worship of local deities, were to be 
extinguished. In response, the survivors repeatedly protested, fearing the 
foreign aesthetic and design being given to their town.
Lifton’s post-bomb psychology suggests that links between survi-
vors and those who spectate is not metaphorical; rather, we are linked by 
psychological components in which the growing spectacle of holocausts 
of the twentieth century has imposed on us all a series of immersions in 
death which mark our existence. Lifton’s ‘death imprint’ or ‘death spell’ 
relates to imagery and the conditions of death: the jarring awareness of 
the fact of death, in his case the grotesque and sudden burning and then 
slow disintegration of A-bomb bodies.
Similarly, the televised tsunami of 2004 encouraged us to imagine 
what it is to drown, with waves bubbling and chattering into concrete 
hotels, but then continuing to rise and swell and rise; laughter and 
surprised cries eventually cease, the brown wave swelling into Bandar 
Aceh carrying away the town. In our minds alone we could never quite 
reach the end of the fantasy. Unlike waves, the death imprint of those in 
earthquakes, as we shall see, is characterized by crushing, falling, the 
fear of falling again and the kind of gasping anxiety produced as certain-
ties move under our feet: madness, submission and images of collapsed 
things that should be standing (Simpson 2013).
Lifton describes the impossibility for the survivor of catastrophe to 
complete what Freud (1917) called the ‘work of mourning’ because there 
is no time to prepare for the theft of life. Survivors of Hiroshima mourn 
for their dead as well as the dead of others, objects and lost symbols, 
but also for beliefs that have been shattered, for a way of life that has 
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vanished. Yet they mourn in vain; the survivor mourns for his former self, 
for what he was before the intrusion of death and the emergence of a life 
impaired by mourning and the guilt of survival. The consequence of the 
survivor’s defence against death anxiety and the guilt of survival is the 
cessation of feeling. We may characterize this lack of feeling as an affec-
tive anaesthesia and as a key element in a broader disaster syndrome.2
Lifton describes the toxic combination of neediness and mistrust among 
bomb survivors: those surrounding them appear as disingenuous (what he 
calls ‘counterfeit nurturance’). In addition, they suffered ‘contagion anxiety’: 
if I come too close to you, I will experience your experience of annihilation 
and later your death, and I do not want that. I do not want to suffer more. 
We take from Lifton the idea that individual survival carries with it the struc-
tural conditions that lead to a more general social fragmentation.
If we marry the ideas of Bode and Lifton, we can see three distinct 
but related forms of post-disaster dynamic. There is opportunity in the 
rupture for the structural reform of countries and regions: the recon-
struction loan with certain conditions attached from an international 
bank, but also the expansion of state bureaucracy. On the same scale, 
there is chance for nation-building and large-scale ethnic politics, the 
march of the generals or the reform of the religious. Secondly, on the 
ground, there is the interface between local institutions, whether pub-
lic or private, and those affected by the disaster. Here, there might be 
a tug of ideas, a competition of rival agendas or an impulse to reform 
and development (however understood); or there might be resistance to 
change via the solace of identity politics, whether in the form of nostalgia 
for a golden age or in the invigoration of ethnic, religious or linguistic 
boundaries. The means and methods are manifold. Finally, there is the 
individual struggle for survival. Nuclear bombs might carry with them 
their own particular psychology; nevertheless, as we shall see, other dis-
astrous situations bring guilt and energy to those who survive. There are 
many other levels between the three, but in a broad sense they give some 
indication of the varying harmonies of violence that a disastrous moment 
of rupture can produce.
In our material, earthquakes emerge as peculiar moments in which 
these different levels come to reverberate, thus producing the possibility 
for change or for a renewed attention towards past things. The loose dis-
courses of power of the everyday come to have a tighter grip on the inti-
mate life of a survivor. Habitual behaviours may also be forgotten in the 
name of reconstruction. Latent conflicts may find the symbolic resources 
for building new and radicalized forms of ideology. Crisis, in the way 
Roitman (2013) has conceptualized it, may justify policies that would 
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not be allowed to fly in normal times. In this sense, the tectonic rupture of 
an earthquake leaves space for the production and reproduction of rup-
turing narratives of human manufacture.
Gujarat
The earthquake in Gujarat took place in January 2001, a time when many 
things in India were changing fast. I (Simpson) had conducted research 
in Gujarat before the disaster. Partially because of this, my attention 
was drawn to my friends who had survived. When I first visited after 
the earthquake in the second half of 2001, it was obvious that the over-
whelming concern of those I knew was the endemic sense of uncertainty 
about the future. They were also struggling to interact with the many 
who had come from elsewhere to use the moment of shock to profit and 
to change the order of things.
Looking back, many people I know well had their lives fundamen-
tally changed by the earthquake; or at least the earthquake now plays 
a prominent role in the way people make sense of their lives. Friends 
or family died, they consequently grieved and remembered. There are 
plentiful rags to riches stories and conspicuously fewer tales of those 
being deprived of their riches for lives of impoverishment. Over the 
years, the earthquake gradually became a marker of time: a point at 
which things changed direction, not radically and without reference 
to the past but rather as a form of filter through which some things 
did not pass while others grew in amplified form. The earthquake has 
become an origin myth, albeit told with knowledge of the previous 
state of things.
At a broad level, and deeply significantly, the earthquake in Gujarat 
brought a new chief minister to power. Narendra Modi, who is now the 
Prime Minister of India, was able to dislodge his predecessor in 2001 
in the name of the earthquake. Keshubhai Patel, Modi claimed, was 
unable to manage post-earthquake reconstruction in the region. Modi 
took charge of Gujarat – never having faced an election – on 7 October 
2001, some nine months after the disaster. As reconstruction got under 
way, he took a keen interest, visited many times, and gave some of his 
most well-known speeches at inauguration and anniversary ceremonies. 
Through reconstruction, his administration worked hard, as we will see, 
to build support for their Hindu nationalist project, developing particu-
lar partnerships, holding strategic renaming ceremonies, and promoting 
new heroes and history for the region.
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In the intervening 17 years, change has been profound. The differ-
ent scales and types of policies co-opted to restructure the region have 
allowed for the formation of new kinds of citizens and consumers as 
well as religious and cultural subjects. Post-earthquake reconstruction 
permitted the ideas and values of Hindu nationalism to be built prom-
inently into the landscape. Public–private partnerships were introduced 
for village reconstruction as a condition of loans from development 
banks. Hundreds of partnerships across the region provided opportu-
nity for cultural and religious organizations to build villages as they saw 
fit. New temples and forms of organized religion were thus presented to 
the villagers, often appearing to have state sanction because the respon-
sibility for clearing up after the calamity was generally regarded to be 
the responsibility of government. The combination of loss and trauma 
caused by the earthquake, the promise of wealth and abundance brought 
by the ‘sponsoring’ organization and the general uncertainties of the 
times meant that new ideas found a welcome home in some villages. 
Generally speaking, organizations with an elective affinity with the 
nationalist interests of the ruling government received contracts for the 
most prestigious and influential reconstruction projects. The earthquake 
thus became a mechanism for entrenching religious and political values 
into the fabric of provincial society through reconstruction.
Elsewhere, land and water were made readily available for the 
new industries that targeted the affected area to avail of tax concessions. 
Against this backdrop, the transformation of the once commonplace, the 
mundane and everyday, in the aftermath was, in many ways, as dramatic 
as the rapid loss of the conspicuous and noteworthy in the moment of ruin 
brought about by the earthquake. The shock of the disaster established 
the condition for the creation of new possibilities, namely an industrial 
society underpinned by the cultural politics of Hindu nationalism.
The longer I watched and listened, the more it was obvious that it 
was not the disaster itself but the doctrines of the interveners that were 
truly shocking: shock-doctrine-SHOCK. I say this because in urgent and 
confused circumstances, the gaze of those on the ground is distracted 
from normal things by spectacle. Rules may be suspended (caste, reli-
gious distinction), and new ones (building, planning and tax) introduced. 
In Gujarat, ‘aftermath time’ was marked most strongly by the struggle of 
the affected with those who intervened, the doctrine-SHOCK era. In this 
sense, aftermath time had both psychological and moral connotations, 
as new arrangements and ideas were battling to find a new peace with 
pre-existing ones. Those bewildered by the earthquake often called the 
aftermath ‘the second earthquake’, suggesting it too was terrible.3
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At the institutional level, as I have already mentioned, the con-
ditions placed on loans by the development banks (Asian and World) 
created the most generalized framework for reconstruction. These con-
ditions demanded the reorganization of local government and the privat-
ization or semi-privatization of many local services, including planning. 
Reconstruction also necessitated private insurance and bank accounts for 
the beneficiaries of housing assistance. At other times, such radical meas-
ures would have been debated and contested; however, in the heat and 
confusion of the moment these measures came into force almost unnoticed.
The industrialization of the region is the most visible consequence 
of the state’s home-grown reconstruction policies (tax breaks and permit-
ted land grabs). In the shadows of these interventions there were other 
technocratic, linguistic and bureaucratic aspects to the post-earthquake 
interventions. The awe of technology contributed to the pacification of 
the affected, as the new district hospital was mounted on springs. The 
swift instrument of town planning cut through old societies, encouraged 
people to learn how to read maps, and to adopt nationalist and suburban 
mentalities. Signs of reconstruction appeared in Hindi, the national but 
previously invisible language in the region. Others brought religious and 
cultural ideas in their relief trucks.
When viewed as a whole, there were a number of serious contradic-
tory pulls in the competing policy frameworks. For example, profession-
als in post-disaster reconstruction are often frustrated by the inability of 
their industry to learn from past calamities. As we will see in the Nepal 
material, such amnesia has been routinized by the ‘disaster paradigm’, or, 
the set of pre-existing knowledge and expectation that disasters engage. 
Emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of the circumstances of each dis-
aster. Concern lies with the cultural conditions of the affected region or, 
similarly, the specificity of patterns of risk or vulnerability. In essence, 
risk/vulnerability is ‘memory bumped forward’ (Jasanoff 2010) or ‘the 
taming of chance’ (Hacking 1990), which, given that local conditions 
are always unique, necessarily means each disaster must be different. 
Therefore, we might reason, all societies are affected by disaster, but this 
or that society has not been affected by this or that disaster before. The 
disaster industry thus operates under the tense conditions of its own mak-
ing: on one hand all disasters are unique, while on the other the standard 
codes and forms have been produced in an attempt to give those working 
in the industry a memory and a frame in which to work.
In short, the bewildered lived among varying superimposed 
spheres, as different ideological forms were traced one over the other. 
Some new formulations of meaning took root and displaced others; some 
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failed (but not many). And so, in the aftermath, those who intervened 
with new ideas and technologies created deep anxiety, or perhaps ambiv-
alence, among the local population over whether change and moderniza-
tion had been a cause of the disaster or were in fact predestined to be the 
primary consequences of reconstruction.
Until recently, the decayed frames of colonial famine and flood relief 
measures influenced contemporary post-disaster interventions in India.4 
Private trusts and charities had also developed parallel structures to chan-
nel compassion and cash to the affected. From a laissez-faire approach to 
disaster relief in the late nineteenth century, the twentieth century has seen 
the emergence of increasing state intervention and control in the aftermath 
of natural disaster.5 The earthquake in Gujarat was but one of the shocks 
that found the existing state of affairs wanting, and prompted the state to 
reform the old policies and design national codes for future bad happen-
ings.6 Consequently, doctrine came in many layers, from diverse sources 
and often with contradictory aims and tensions. Banks, national and state 
governments, local administrative units, private sector and humanitarian 
organizations all contributed their own favourite ingredients to the mix.
At the third or most intimate level there were other dynamics at play. 
For some, there was grief and mourning for people with names and per-
sonalities. For others, the moment of the earthquake left scars of incom-
prehension, which later became madness or recurrent foreboding. But the 
most general sense was that history had imploded into a rumbling moment 
and meaning had collapsed. At first, a sense of intensified community or 
humanity seemed to be blooming, as people helped and talked to those 
they usually ignored. This sensation was on the whole short-lived, and in 
the months and years to come other dynamics took hold. Following the 
aforementioned earthquake in Peru, the spirit of ‘brotherhood’ lasted two 
or three days.7 Similar reports were provided by those we met in Gujarat 
and Nepal. At first, people helped one another. After a few days, some 
said as many as 15, older patterns were restored. Secrecy ran through the 
town as compensation schemes and rumours of new property made people 
greedy and jealous. After a few years, a smug euphoria emerged as people 
were wealthy and had goods and cash aplenty. There was a short phase in 
which regional identity was promoted as a way to counter those who had 
come from the outside with foreign ideas. On the whole, however, survival 
tended to push people apart rather than bringing them together, a trend 
that was mirrored in the concrete plans to reduce the population density of 
the town through mass-suburbanization.
As months passed and new loyalties and configurations appeared, 
initial moments of cooperation gave way to other kinds of rupture 
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running through the aftermath. The population of Gujarat is far from 
homogeneous, and the different cultures of eastern and western parts of 
the state came firmly into contact through reconstruction. Most doctrine 
was brought from the east, where the big cities and centres of govern-
ment are to be found. The ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ with which doctrines 
and policies were supposed to engage were generally not the ‘truths’ or 
‘realities’ of local people themselves. At various times, the state and other 
doctrinaires began to see the people as ungrateful when they protested 
about what they were being offered. Often it was said that the people of 
Kutch in the west, where the earthquake had had most effect, did not have 
enough culture or education to see the benefits in the new reconstructed 
scheme of things. Those who came from the east to reconstruct the west 
brought with them the authority of state power and a greater sense of a 
‘Gujarati culture’. They also came with the knowledge that those in the 
west were victims, and this contributed to their sense of self-confidence.
Over those years of research, it was possible to see how those who 
intervened in the aftermath brought with them various understand-
ings of tragedy and right and wrong, in addition to some well-formed 
ideas (however misplaced) about the kind of people they had come to 
help. Conversely, those affected by the disaster struggled to differentiate 
between those who had come to intervene. Were all interventionists the 
same? Were there good and best organizations? It took a long time for 
the contours of that particular landscape to become visible.
In Gujarat, we see policy and organizations that understood the 
importance of rupture and unsettlement for making things anew. Many 
of the interventions saw the earthquake as an opportunity for putting 
forward new ideas and ways of doing things. Some of these interventions 
were calculated and experienced, perhaps based on a knowledge of pre-
vious disasters; other interventions were tentative and formed more by 
the conditions of the moment than by a long-term plan. The earthquake 
shook things up, rendered visible the commonplace of what had been 
there. In the confusion, fear and avarice on the ground combined with 
state uncertainty and ready-made plans of development banks to distil 
the values of political nationalism through reconstruction.
Nepal earthquake: the grammar of bureaucracy
Between April and May 2015, two devastating earthquakes struck Nepal, 
causing almost 9,000 deaths and leaving a path of destruction. What fol-
lowed was a period of significant change. For those who survived, there 
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was pain in mourning, anger for delays and inequalities, and hope for 
better times to come. With time, the sorrow for what had been lost turned 
into new forms of expectation. Indeed, similarly to what happened in 
Gujarat, the earthquake proved functional in problematizing relations 
between citizens and the state, already fractious in normal times. As I 
(Serafini) happened to be in the country shortly after the earthquake, I 
observed these events at first hand and in raw form. Cognizant of what 
had happened in Gujarat some years earlier, I could focus on the everyday 
ruptures of life to see if the same history was going to be made again. In 
this section, I will not speak with the certainty that comes when the dust 
is settled and new scaffoldings are unveiled. Rather, I will look ethno-
graphically at the points of juncture between the aforementioned scales 
of uncertainty and intervention to see how different ruptures were pro-
duced and tentatively bridged in the early aftermath of a tectonic shift.
As we have seen in the Gujarat case, an earthquake does not happen 
in a vacuum. Although devastation and death may suspend the normal 
rhythm of life, history does not collapse like a poorly built column in a 
low-rise housing block. Soon after the disaster, many villagers started 
reassembling things with the means they had at their disposal. There 
were those who rebuilt houses themselves and without fuss; those who 
found temporary refuge with relatives; and those who capitalized on pri-
vate connections to reboot life without waiting for the government to act. 
In the decade prior to the earthquake, a growing and largely unregulated 
remittance economy had allowed households throughout the country to 
accumulate relative wealth under the puzzled eyes of a powerless state. 
Where neither investment in land, urban houses and commodities nor 
the repayment of loans had sucked dry the migratory economy, people 
often did not wait for either state or private aid to start rebuilding things. 
Bricks and corrugated tin sheets, after all, could just be retrieved from 
rubble. Where not available, they could be purchased. A World Bank 
report (Ratha et al. 2016, 16–17) clearly showed how remittances (and 
only those sent through formal channels) surged 20.9 per cent to $6.6 
billion in 2015, and particularly so in the months following the earth-
quake in April – a steady growth from the 3.2 per cent rate of the previous 
year and way more than the $4 billion pledged by international donors 
for the reconstruction. For many of those who had relatives abroad at 
the time of tremors, remittances constituted a better short-term recovery 
scheme than any superimposed rehabilitation policy.
In the aftermath of the earthquake, the state entered into a crisis. 
It was not only that governmental buildings and the personnel of public 
offices had not been spared by tremors from ruination, but also that the 
 EARTHqUAKE C IT IZENS:  dISASTER ANd AFTERMATH POLIT ICS IN INdIA ANd NEPAL 203
quake revealed the fragility of governance in the country. In the wake 
of the disaster, in fact, foreign governments, volunteers and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) had sprung into action with an alacrity that 
could not be matched by the government. In less than two days, profes-
sional aid groups had come from everywhere, their uniforms and logos 
constituting a new landscape to be learned. Quickly and with minimal 
governmental intercession, emergency camps had been set up in play-
grounds and open fields. Two weeks after the first tremors, Nepal seemed 
like a land of conquest. Chinese flags could be seen waving amidst the 
rubble of famous heritage sites; foreign armies and international NGOs 
(INGOs) were distributing tents, blankets and food under the uncertain 
guidance of improvised translators; Japanese teams of engineers were 
giving instructions on how to assess damage; and helicopters painted 
with the colours of the Indian flag were delivering aid from the sky, pro-
ducing a mixture of awe and resentment amidst people on the ground.
Resentment took the form of what Bin Xu (2014), in relation to 
the Sichuan earthquake, has termed a ‘consensus crisis’. The earthquake 
acted as an event that erased and restarted long processes of negotia-
tion, interrupting silences and pushing people to speak out loudly about 
what had previously remained in the realm of unspoken dissatisfaction. 
Citizens everywhere could be heard asking ‘hāmro sarkār kahã chha?’ – 
‘where is our government?’ In fact, discontent towards the government 
was not particularly novel. Twenty years of political instability, ongoing 
constitutional uncertainty and civil war had already made people wary of 
the state and its representatives. In some locations, the complete absence 
of elected administrative bodies for over two decades had exacerbated a 
feeling of distance and reciprocal unreliability. The earthquake, with its 
attendant delays and malpractices, further contributed to a general sense 
of inefficiency, unveiling a naked king. As one seasoned commentator of 
Nepali politics put it bluntly, the government was ‘caught with its pants 
down’ (D. Thapa 2015).
The perception of loyalties being stressed and torn apart was further 
strengthened by the sudden rupture of traditional tools of governance. 
At the time of damage assessment, what could have been potentially 
precious information templates – from cadastral maps of properties and 
registered households to disaggregated data concerning land ownership 
(lalpurja) and population – were largely ignored in favour of newer, 
internationally defined formats. As Yogesh Raj and Bhaskar Gautam 
have rightly noticed: ‘just when ... state agencies needed to recover ... 
details and act swiftly to relieve people of their misery, they were struck 
by a severe bout of amnesia’ (2015, 27). Instead of giving continuity to 
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previous data, the machinery of assessment thus relied on standard for-
mats developed within common international frameworks for disaster 
management. Pre-compiled documents written in English were used to 
ascertain the identities of victims; ‘rapid visual assessment’ practices 
were established with no cognition of the extreme variety of architec-
tural styles and masonry in the country; clustering of life and people was 
done in a whimsical manner. What followed was confusion, drama and 
calculation; but also renewal in the form of an increasingly bureaucra-
tized everyday life.
The menace to sovereignty produced by an impressive post-earth-
quake mobilization of people, foreign institutions and private charities 
was not unnoticed by the state. With the aim to regain control of the 
situation, a number of actions were taken by the government. Already 
during the emergency phase, the government attempted to centralize 
relief through the creation of a Prime Minister Relief Fund (a tradition 
across South Asia), through which all donations were to be channelled. 
At the same time, special provisions were issued to limit earthquake-re-
lated interventions only to NGOs and INGOs that had been present in 
the country prior to the disaster. In some instances, the state’s suspicious 
attempts to control processes of aid distribution caused indignation and 
further troubles. A diplomatic crisis almost burst out upon accusations 
that the government was blocking vital supplies owing to peacetime cus-
toms rules. For some, the state’s reactions to a crisis of legitimacy had 
the contrary effect of intensifying discontent amongst citizens and media 
alike. In such a situation of emergency, many people complained, the 
brokerage of relief by the state was taken as a harmful caprice. As the 
editor-in-chief of a popular English-language daily put it in a challenging 
tone, ‘and now, eat nationalism!’
Yet, while an elite section of Kathmandu’s civil society and almost 
the whole of the international press endlessly reproduced standard nar-
ratives of government failing and corruption, affected people began turn-
ing to the state for long-term compensation, rehabilitation and succour. 
For most, complaining about the state was just part of the story, good for 
gossip with friends at a tea stall or for searching a common ground of 
understanding with hungry journalists, but not the central component of 
what was going on.
As weeks passed by, a vast array of policies was formulated with 
the aim of bridging ruptures that had turned political. In the process, 
new ideas and frameworks came to parse everyday life and mould novel 
citizens and political subjects. Through these frameworks, the state was 
given the chance to re-enter into people’s lives in a new attire and, for 
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many, in an unprecedented way. Citizens were steadily transformed into 
earthquake victims (bhukampa pidhit). A resurgent culture of expec-
tation was rearticulated in a new grammar, made of victims’ identity 
documents, compensation schemes and expanding bureaucracy. While 
public outbursts of anger towards the government kept spilling out of the 
well-remunerated pens of both national and international journalists, 
many people on the ground began learning the new dialect of post-disas-
ter recovery. A dialect, not a language, because it still seemed to draw on 
a well-rooted rhetoric of development (bikas) in the country:8 bhukampa 
pidhit became the new garib (poor), while new terms such as ‘resilience’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ made their way into the mouths of 
many.
Despite being applied to a completely different setting, the same 
vocabulary of vulnerability, risk reduction and resilience that we had 
heard in Gujarat came to parse and intersect the myriad ways in which 
people talked about the seismic event. The institutional setting within 
which this new language had been first created and from which it was 
now being shouted out, indeed, conferred to certain words the power to 
stand for the overarching discourse on the earthquake.
The management of rupture has a comparative history of its own. 
Discussions abounded on how things could be ‘built back better’ (echo-
ing the slogan first heard in the region after the 2004 tsunami). Specific 
issues that had been singled out as problems within a logic of vulner-
ability were given a general bearing, thus moving from being peculiar 
only to earthquake-affected regions to being applicable to the country as 
a whole. If recovery had to be followed by prosperity, and if short-cycled 
practices of resilience were to be strengthened by longer-term politics of 
security and risk reduction, new measures, plans and technologies had 
to be implemented nationwide. Envisioned changes had to encompass 
a multiplicity of scales, from more circumscribed fields such as those of 
house engineering or private banking to the broader ones of energy pro-
duction and infrastructural expansion.
‘Resilience’ became an essential concept in the language of the 
aftermath, one that well signalled the complex tension between the state 
and its citizens in the wake of the disaster. Soon after the earthquake, 
both national and international media praised Nepalis for their ‘resil-
ience’. Like many other technical terms, it mainly appeared in English-
language newspapers that winked to those who could use the word in 
their daily relations with donors and INGOs. Unsurprisingly, the term 
was also meant to praise those civil associations and common folk who 
had shown courage despite a weak and corrupt state.
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The word comes from Latin resilire, which means ‘to bounce back’, 
‘to return to an original shape after a trauma’. Although historically used 
to designate elastic materials, it has recently been applied to human 
beings, signifying their capacity to return after depression, physical and 
moral traumas. Without the innate resilience of its citizens, it was said, 
Nepal would have had a much worst aftermath. Nepalese were resilient 
because they knew how to handle difficulties at a time of crisis, they were 
elastic enough to endure often blurry processes of distribution, they were 
liveable enough to face depression and face an absent government. It 
comes as no surprise that resilience soon became the adjectival hub of a 
nationalistic pride, especially for those who understood the meaning of 
the English term.
Yet, in order to justify intervention, the resilience concept was 
slowly reformulated in a twist which is shared with other post-disas-
ter contexts (Benadusi 2013). Resilience became the conceptual aim 
of post-earthquake reconstruction, in line with an international rheto-
ric that had already been circulated for some years by institutions such 
as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States Agency for 
International Aid (USAID) and the UK Department for International 
Development. ‘Transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (pādarshitā and java-
phdehitā in Nepali-language newspapers) were included as essential 
tools for achieving the grand vision and pointed to what both the govern-
ment and citizens alike had to develop. In the translation, some mean-
ings were lost and others emerged. Javaphdehitā thus became the quality 
connoting the responsible person, in quite a practical sense of the one 
who responds to questions of any sort, or with a negative inflection of 
someone who has to take responsibility for a misdeed. In a context where 
the contact list on one’s mobile phone is revealing of a person’s social 
connectivity, javaphdehitā left the world of bureaucratic accountability 
and entered the pragmatic one of personal relations. Likewise, resilience 
became suraksha (security) as the ideal allowing the proliferation of dif-
ferent policies of control.
In order to have a strong and secure national recovery, the gov-
ernment attached side measures to rehabilitation policies. In the name 
of transparency and economic integration, remittances had to be con-
trolled and regulated. At the presentation of the budget for Fiscal Year 
2017/2018, Minister for Finance Krishna Bahadur Mahara clearly stated: 
‘Arrangements will be made toward making it mandatory for aspiring 
migrant workers to open a bank account before going for foreign employ-
ment’ (Ghimire 2017). Following the earthquake, the state sought to 
regain legitimacy by creating conditions for domestic employment and 
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by regulating that remittance economy whose informality had so suc-
cessfully helped people to thrive at a time of crisis.
Similarly, support for rebuilding houses was mainly given through 
the Rural Housing Reconstruction Project, jointly developed by the 
Government of Nepal and major donors (World Bank 2015). In order to 
be eligible beneficiaries of this programme, applicants were requested 
to sign a legally binding participation agreement with their respective 
village district committee or municipality. The participation agreement, 
as it was referred to in official documents, outlined ‘the entitlements and 
obligations of both parties regarding key details of the program such as 
payment, housing construction standards, and grievance redress mech-
anisms’ (World Bank 2015, 5). It was upon signing the agreement that 
people started receiving technical and social support to rebuild their 
houses, in line with a newly formed National Building Code that fostered 
resilient buildings. A subsidy of NPR 200,000 (later adjusted to NPR 
300,000 to cover inflation in building costs),9 disbursed in three tranches, 
was granted to those who could provide full documentation of ownership 
and citizenship. Money was to be transferred through formal banking. 
A special provision, moreover, was detailed for those who had started 
rebuilding things on their own. Again, subsidy was made dependent on 
compliance with standards of construction, on the provision of full doc-
umentation of ownership and of access to official channels of economic 
integration. The ideals of donors could thus be engraved in governmen-
tal compensation schemes from the outset.
Such an approach, which had been envisioned and justified in the 
terms of an accountable and transparent procedure to compensate ‘the 
right amount to the right people’, was not devoid of troubles and ine-
qualities. On the ground, earthquake victims who were living in remote 
rural areas had to travel long distances and spend thousands of rupees to 
reach bank branches usually situated in the regional headquarters; once 
there, long queues and delays in the transferring of money forced many 
to stay and wait in the headquarters for days, if not weeks. Moreover, an 
owner-driven reconstruction left out all renters and those incapable of 
providing satisfactory documents. It also opened up spaces of interfer-
ence for middle men and brokers of all sorts to step in: local cadres of 
political parties interested in intersecting funds or unblocking situations 
in exchange for future votes; professional writers and lekhapān (nota-
ries), mostly high-caste Bahun, acting as consultants and playing on their 
expertise of the law and on personal connections in bureaucratic offices; 
Catholic professionals sent to give consultancies in exchange for the rec-
ognition of theological efficiency.
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In the new setting, ruptures that had only been latent before the 
earthquake were now accelerated owing to the conditions created by the 
seismic event. Bureaucracy entered into people’s lives and intersected 
decisional processes imbued by doubt and uncertainty. As Haxby (2017) 
shows in his ethnography of households’ strategies of recovery, joint 
estates were legally separated between competing brothers; previous 
cycles of reproduction of amity and moral values amongst household-
ers were interrupted; and long-term, informal temporalities of affect 
were ruptured into a drier and better punctuated discourse on own-
ership, documentation and bureaucracy. With money pouring in for 
reconstruction – and often even for reconstructing what used to be of 
no concern whatsoever for the legal owner – fluid processes of occupa-
tion, informal renting, land usage and so forth were reduced and framed 
in the uncontradictory and exclusivist logics relating to ownership and 
documentation: this is mine, this is not. Infrastructural expansion, the 
decentralization of administrative structures and the fiscalization of the 
territory thus became ‘instrumental effects’ of a reconstruction project 
that never aimed only at rebuilding earthquake-affected areas – a hyper-
bolic process of bureaucratic intensification reminiscent of the expand-
ing states described by Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998).
The earthquake also gave momentum to political processes that had 
been stalled for years. In less than five months after the first earthquake, 
then prime minister Sushil Koirala announced that an agreement had 
been reached amongst the four major parties for drafting a much-awaited 
new Constitution. With the so-called ‘emergency phase’ still ongoing, 
Nepal obtained what could not be obtained in the past decade. On 20 
September 2015, the Constitution was promulgated, after the deal had 
eluded citizens well after the failure of the first Constituent Assembly in 
2012. Seasoned commentators on Nepali politics began wondering why 
things had taken such a sudden turn. Some believed the government had 
found in constitution-drafting a desperate way for regaining state legiti-
macy in troublesome times; others glimpsed in it a practical response to 
the ever-increasing pressures of international donors and development 
banks, whose pleas for stability and for a structural readjustment of fiscal 
policies and administration could not be left unanswered; the most criti-
cal ones accused party leaders of chipping in on a popular piece of paper 
for drawing unwanted gazes away from all the troubles that had been 
festering in the rubble, while advancing personal agendas and exclusion-
ary politics that would be more difficult to handle in normal times (Jha 
2015; M. Thapa 2015). Whatever the reason may be, Nepal was given a 
new foundation when all others seemed to be failing.
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The foundation came in the shape of a federal state. For the first 
time in the history of the country, Nepal was officially declared a federal 
democratic republic. Its territory was to be divided into seven provinces, 
whose boundaries were ideally drawn on the basis of a mixture of iden-
tity and capability criteria. Geographical continuity, language, culture 
and ethnicity were to be considered alongside administrative governa-
bility, potential for infrastructure development, availability of natural 
resources and economic interrelationships in the making of new borders. 
Thus formed, provinces could work in a more autonomous manner, while 
provincial elections would decide the 165 members of Parliament. This 
exercise in collaging and decentralization had been at the basis of pre-
vious failures in drafting the Constitution. Now, the earthquake seemed 
to have provided the right condition for expediting the process without 
much second thought.
The new Constitution was saluted with joy and hope by a substan-
tial chunk of the population. Candlelit ceremonies were held in many 
seriously affected districts, soon becoming signals of an upcoming period 
of renovation; welcoming banners for a new Nepal were hung at the 
entrance gate of villages and neighbourhoods; and a touching ceremony 
was organized at Kasthamandap, one of the historic hubs of Kathmandu, 
with leaf plates burning around the image of a bygone Dharahara tower: 
this was circulated on all media. A sudden gust of national belonging 
rushed through the rubble, with top-tier politicians blowing in the wind 
their speeches of unity and renovation.
Yet, while pleasing donors and everyone who hoped for a refreshing 
wave of stability, critical stances towards such a ‘fast-tracked’ document 
were not absent. In fact, the Constitution was promulgated in a climate 
of resurgent ethnic politics. For weeks prior to the official announce-
ment, people in the Southern plains of Nepal (Tarai) had been protesting 
against a state that, they felt, was profiting from a situation of emergency 
to erase years of struggle for recognition. Since Nepal had emerged as a 
unified nation at the end of the eighteenth century, the political econ-
omy of the country had been flourishing around a fundamental postu-
late: people from the hills are different from the people of the plains 
(Madeshi). For most of the past two centuries, the Gangetic soils of the 
Tarai had been more the agricultural goldmine for a hillcentric politics of 
extraction than an integrated part of Nepal’s self-crafted national iden-
tity. The new Constitution was now further strengthening a hillcentric 
state ideology. Seen from the perspective of Madeshi leaders and critical 
analysts (Lal 2016), the introduction of unfavourable rules of citizenship, 
the demarcation of federal state borders so as to reinforce old patterns of 
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dominance and the dissolution of equitable provisions contained in the 
former Interim Constitution of Nepal were all clear instances of the dura-
bility of exclusionary politics. The post-earthquake wind of unity thus 
turned incendiary.
As protests took place and people kept dying – more than 60 casual-
ties would be counted at the end of the conflict – a blockade of the Nepal–
India border (nākābandi) was enforced. In a characteristic convergence 
of institutional and street stereotyping in the country, Madeshi’s quests 
for recognition were turned into a matter of international geopolitics. 
People started blaming Madeshi and Indian leaders indiscriminately, 
their responsibility for stalling essential goods in a post-earthquake 
emergency phase taken as a particularly serious issue.
With petrol and gas blocked at the Indian border, life in earth-
quake-hit areas became tangibly more difficult – if that was possible. In 
Kathmandu, one had to spend hours lining up in queues just to obtain a 
few gallons of petrol; kitchen stoves ran low on gas, and many restaurants 
had to shut down or adopt ‘Modi-fied’ menus (a play on words inspired by 
a widespread feeling of resentment towards the Indian prime minister); 
and hospitals and pharmacies ran short of medicine, as the blockade was 
now affecting the delivery of all kinds of goods. The nākābandi was also 
extensively used to explain why some things were stopping and why oth-
ers had not started yet. Both the government and I/NGOs started com-
plaining about the shortage of petrol and gas for justifying their inability 
to carry on with the recovery. Street beggars and unemployed youths 
soon took the chance to earn some money by queuing on demand. In 
the countryside and up the mountains, the situation was either slightly 
better or terribly worse. Old practices were recovered at the time of need. 
Homemade chulos – wood-burning stoves – reappeared in their dozens, 
at least where people could retrieve the precious red earth (rāto māto) of 
which they are made. Trees were cut and the price of wood went through 
a period of hyperbolic inflation. Some villagers profited from the situa-
tion to pump up their incomes.
At the same time, while temporary shelters had yet to be delivered 
and the reconstruction proper was still at a vestigial stage, fantasized 
images of future developments started appearing in the press. Pictures of 
engineeringly sound buildings, often legitimated with the stamp of the 
Nepal Engineering Association, were widely circulated on newspapers 
and social media; working plans of railways, highways and smart cities 
caught the imagination of many; projects for the reconstruction of ‘model’ 
villages mushroomed. Even the project of making Nepal a self-sufficient 
hydro-nation gained momentum along the lines of a post-earthquake 
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ideology of risk reduction, economic growth and security – one that was 
backed up by the interests of development banks and donors (Lord 2016). 
If such images, inflected in the popular, future-looking grammar of bikas 
(development), had been part of life before the earthquake as well, now 
they were reformulated in the catchy terms of an ameliorative project of 
recovery and security. In the process, what had been daily practices of sur-
vival at the time of the crisis, especially in the countryside, were reartic-
ulated in the grammar of commendable and yet short-term instances of 
resilience, to be enhanced and made more effective within a modernist 
logic of risk reduction suitable to the needs of a growing urban nation.
Conclusion
Aftermath refers to the second growth or crop in the same season, the new 
flush of grass after mowing, which is often quite different in its qualities to 
the first crop; but it is still grass. The second crop may grow unevenly as 
it races for the light. It may pale before establishing itself. Aftermath is a 
measure of a quality of time and growth. It is also popular to think about 
disasters leading to a tabula rasa, or blank slate. The term refers to society 
akin to the unformed and featureless mind found in the philosophy of John 
Locke.10 Destruction wipes things clean so that they can be remade anew. 
Naomi Klein in her appropriately titled Shock Doctrine finds obvious fault 
with this idea, adopting a metaphor of her own. She describes the exper-
iments of psychologists who thought that if the personality of a patient 
could be erased, then it could be built back again without fault or disor-
der.11 To this end, patients were deprived of all routine and structure, and 
were subjected to irregular and disorienting sensory stimulation. Despite 
initial successes, the psychologists were often frustrated by the return of 
elements of the patient’s original personality. So too, in Gujarat and Nepal, 
those who came to intervene did not find the featureless mind they might 
have hoped for. However, in both locations we can see nation-building, 
expanding states and intimate transformations that can be empirically tied 
to the earthquake. Remarkably, we can also see regime change in Gujarat 
and radical constitutional reform in Nepal, both of which have strong and 
clearly identifiable origins in the moment of the earthquake.
Aftermaths often appear to have similar structures characterized by 
the interaction of shock and stun with new intentions and plans. They 
cannot, however, be seen as a generic sociological condition, for the 
shocks and doctrines vary. An aftermath is a product of the longer history 
of the locality. The world does not implode into the moment of disaster 
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to emerge afresh or ready to be remade in any old way. Older ideas will 
not disappear: old Bhuj was thrown into disarray by the earthquake, yet 
the national flag was still raised to mark Republic Day before the dust 
had settled. Likewise, post-earthquake grievances of blame and poverty 
in Nepal drew on well-established grammars of complaint and hierarchy 
in the country. In both moments, people found their way home despite 
the absence of streets and buildings; networks of amity and economic 
support did not vanish in the rubble; Bhuj was reconstructed from archi-
val sources and the Madeshi were kept at the usual distance in the new 
federal setting. In sum, there was no clean slate in rupture.
Yet the sudden suspension of certainty that comes with an earth-
quake makes people dubious about the proper course of action. How to 
tame the sense of things being torn apart? In history, the sublime reach 
of catastrophe has led to speculation on the possible purpose of mass 
death and destruction in the grander scheme of things. In particular, 
the catastrophe of an earthquake has provided opportunity to recon-
sider how men should properly relate to their gods, and has prompted 
additional speculation on God’s supposed intentions. We have described 
the promotion of neo-liberal Hindu nationalism in Gujarat and the 
formation of bureaucratic subjects in Nepal. In both locations, codes, 
regulations and new ways of ordering chaos and thought became the 
order of the day. The momentum to reform and restructure the state and 
relations between people and the state was central to disaster politics 
in Gujarat and Nepal. In Gujarat, the east moved on the west; in Nepal, 
highland moved on lowland, as spatial and identity politics entered the 
debate about rights and privileges of development. In both locations too 
we saw regime change and an intensification and occasional renewal of 
pre-disaster politics. These events were accompanied by the personal 
stories of grief, guilt and gain, and the difficulties of surviving. If one 
looks deep enough, there is a possibility for comparison in aftermaths.
The 1755 Lisbon earthquake is much written about by those seek-
ing to understand the debate enlivened by the disaster about whether 
optimism or pessimism was the underlying philosophical condition of 
eighteenth-century Europe. Looking at the earthquake with hindsight, 
historians have wondered whether the shock of the disaster pushed 
the Enlightenment in certain godless directions. Some say it did; oth-
ers believe the paradigm shift from God to rational science was already 
under way.12 But what of the moral and philosophical content of the 
debates provoked by the earthquake? Do these have relevance for think-
ing about the earthquakes we have discussed? Can we think compara-
tively about the thoughts people have in the aftermath of a disaster? Or 
 EARTHqUAKE C IT IZENS:  dISASTER ANd AFTERMATH POLIT ICS IN INdIA ANd NEPAL 213
do the thoughts earthquakes provoke only belong to a particular place 
and time, in this case Lisbon and Europe of the mid-eighteenth century?
At the time of the tremors, Lisbon was a prosperous mercantile cen-
tre. The destruction of its inhabitants and wealth by an earthquake and 
the ensuing floods and fires reverberated across Europe. Lisbon was also 
known for its inquisitors and idolatry, which added a sharp edge to events 
in the aftermath. The Protestant clergy in northern Europe asserted that 
the earthquake happened because the people of Lisbon were Roman 
Catholics. The clergy of Lisbon, on the other hand, felt that the shock 
was the result of divine anger at the presence of certain Protestants in the 
town. The heretics were forcibly baptized and a splendid auto-da-fé was 
held, with a view to preventing further disaster.
Lisbon, too, like Gujarat and Nepal, boomed after the math of its 
destruction, and the new glory sat uneasily with the images of loss, 
wrath and human sacrifice that accompanied the initial news of the 
earthquake. The tugs and contradictions of the destruction and the pros-
perous aftermath detained some of the foremost thinkers of the age: 
Rousseau, Voltaire and Kant. They discussed the death of God, whether 
God’s design for the world was the best of all possible designs and, if so, 
what place there was for the terror and destruction of an earthquake. Is 
chance or fate the general principle of universal operation? Is death a 
greater evil when it strikes at many people simultaneously, rather than 
removing them at intervals?
Their thought shows that earthquakes shake certainties as well as 
foundations, and, therefore, they necessarily became part of the discus-
sions of theologians and philosophers. For the Christian theologians, 
earthquakes were instruments of fear, operating either as a routine and 
indiscriminate part of the divine order of things, or as divine instru-
ments of punishment, which could be distributed when appropriate. 
Consequently, not only in Europe, but in India and Nepal, aftermaths 
have often spawned the rise of new religious forms, as the beleaguered 
have become zealots, transforming their fear, guilt, trauma, ecstasy or 
rapture into improved forms of devotion or into ritualized apologies for 
their wrongdoings. In Bode’s Peru of the 1970s, the religious resurgence 
took the form of a battle between different currents of Christianity. The 
discussions that followed the Lisbon earthquake, although not restricted 
to that disaster by any means, marked another kind of critical shift and 
added momentum to thinking in the Enlightenment mode.
The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 broke Voltaire’s faith in the doctrine 
of ‘whatever is, is right’. In his first poem on the earthquake, he (1756) 
attacked the optimism represented by characters such as Pope: ‘come, 
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ye philosophers, who cry, “All’s well”, And contemplate this ruin of a 
world’.13 Voltaire mocked: whatever happened must have happened for 
the best of all possible reasons! In Lisbon, the heirs of the dead will ben-
efit financially; the building trade will enjoy a boom; animals will grow 
fat on meals provided by corpses trapped in the debris; an earthquake 
is a necessary effect of a necessary cause; private misfortune must not 
be overrated; an individual who is unlucky is contributing to the gen-
eral good. Is this the best of all possible worlds? Is there not as much evil 
in these sentiments – Voltaire asked – as in the earthquake itself? For 
Voltaire, man could not hope for a safe life with benevolent protection of 
Providence rewarding virtuous behaviour. The saddening truth is that we 
know nothing of our origin, purpose or destiny. Nature has no message 
for us. God does not speak. The bodies of men are made for decay and 
our minds for grief.
Rousseau was unhappy with Voltaire’s views on our fate. He said 
that at a personal level the optimism Voltaire attacked had helped him to 
endure the very things supposed to be unendurable. For Rousseau, man 
must recognize evil as the consequence of his own nature as well as that 
of the universe. A benevolent God desired to preserve man from evil, and 
of all the possible systems whereby God’s creation might be ordered, God 
had chosen the one that contained the least evil and the most good. Put 
bluntly, said Rousseau, the reason why God had not done better for man-
kind was that God could not do better. Rousseau maintained that moral 
evil originated in man himself, not God, and that, even though physical 
evil is a necessary part of the creation, the majority of physical evils are 
man’s own fault. According to him, it was not nature or God that had 
congregated 20,000 houses of six or seven storeys in Lisbon. If the inhab-
itants of the city had not lived in crowded and dangerous buildings, the 
damage would have been less. Had they left the city after the first shock, 
then they could have been saved. Instead, they stayed obstinately on the 
spot, worrying about their money and their possessions. For Rousseau, 
there was sociology in the disaster as well as theology and philosophy.
These lyrical discussions serve to show how earthquakes impose 
on the imagination in practical, sociological and philosophical registers. 
The philosopher sublimates the variegated doubts that an earthquake 
produces into a moment of epistemological, even theological, rupture. 
Is God dead, or is He simply incapable of catering for His worshippers? 
Is Evil a part of God or the unwanted offspring of humanity? In the same 
vein, we like to think, as the planner or the political leader embroiders 
narratives of blame and rehabilitation, and reassures the citizens who 
have been left to wonder about their future amidst rubble. In this sense, 
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the doubt and hope of the Enlightenment philosophers no longer seem 
so profound. Their thoughts are the stuff of teashop chat on the streets of 
South Asia. The earthquake, wherever it takes place, is an opportunity to 
take ownership of the story and to turn abstract thoughts into concrete 
realities. These doubts and hopes are those that allow for the implemen-
tation of new building codes, bureaucratic citizenship and the renaming 
of prominent public spaces after once-obscure figures in nationalist his-
tory. The oscillation between life and death also allows the governments 
of India and China to develop their influence within Nepal through the 
creation of infrastructure and supply chains.
Our discussions of events in South Asia have also shown how earth-
quakes break, disorient and bereave. They have also allowed for the 
formation of new policy landscapes, new forms of citizens and govern-
ments. Earthquakes are opportunities for those with the composure and 
gall to see them as such. The long drag and conclusion of processes in 
Gujarat contrasts with the contingency and immediacy that still animates 
Nepal. In Nepal, we have seen the opportunism of fleet-footed interna-
tional organizations seeking to make the world new.
Regime change and constitutional reform are not perhaps linked to 
earthquakes with any organic or scientific certainty. However, the fail-
ure of God, buildings and society to protect leads to the distinct sense 
of betrayal that comes with inevitable delays to post-earthquake recon-
struction. In both Nepal and Gujarat, dramatic changes to government 
occurred at about the same time as people had come to terms with what 
had happened to them and were beginning to understand what needed 
to be done in order to make things better. The urge to rebuild individual 
lives and houses thus clashed with the ideas and plans of those who could 
ease recovery. Out of the crisis of judgement, new forms of narrative fol-
lowed. Earthquakes allow for storytelling, and effective storytellers may 
find particularly receptive audiences given the conditions of particular 
uncertainty that earthquakes bring with them.
Notes
1. The edited works of Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna Hoffman (1999) and in reverse name 
order (2002) have been influential.
2. On syndromes and New Orleans see Adams et al. (2009).
3. This ascription of disaster-like qualities to the aftermath is commonly reported. The wave of 
aid in Sri Lanka was called the ‘second tsunami’, for example.
4. See, for example, Klein (1984) on famine relief and D’Souza (2006) on flood control in India.
5. Tirthankar Roy (2008) suggests that patterns of response during the period see the destruc-
tion of state capacity, which activates anarchic unregulated markets and private institutions, 
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until the state bounces back to take control. We see some resemblance of this pattern in Guja-
rat, with the additional influence of the international community and the partnership of state 
and private interests in reconstruction.
6. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Bill was passed as Act 20 of 2003. A national disaster 
management bill was passed in 2005.
7. Anthony Oliver-Smith (1986, 76) writing about the Peruvian earthquake and landslide of 
1970. Rebecca Solnit (2010) sees the moment of post-disaster disorientation as a possible 
source of new politics. While sympathetic with the sentiment, the nationalist and cultural 
chauvinism evident in Gujarat were probably not the forms of utopia Solnit had in mind.
8. For critical approaches to the ideology of bikas in Nepal, see Pigg (1992, 1996); Fujikura 
(2013); Heaton-Shrestha (2004).
9. World Bank (2018).
10. John Locke (1632–1704), the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, thought humans were 
born without innate ideas, and that knowledge is instead determined only by experiences 
derived from sensual perception (see Baird and Kaufmann 2008).
11. Naomi Klein (2007, 25–48) outlines this theory in a chapter provocatively entitled ‘The Tor-
ture Lab: Ewen Cameron, the CIA and the Maniacal Quest to Erase and Remake the Human 
Mind’.
12. Recent historians such as Goldberg (1989), Larsen (2006), Paice (2008), Shrady (2008) and 
Wootton (2000) contribute to placing the earthquake and its debates in proper context. Ken-
drick (1955) remains the classic account of the English sources.
13. From Voltaire’s poem on the Lisbon disaster; or an examination of the axiom ‘All is well’ (see 
1988).
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